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States Credit Bureau, said instrument is not subject to the 
attack here made by appellants. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and 
Pullen, J., pro tem:, concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied Novem-
ber 13, 1941. 
[So F. No. 16546. In Bank.-Oct. 17, 1941.] 
DIANE LEE CARBONE, a Minor, etc., Petitioner, V. SUPE-
RIOR COURT OF NAPA COUNTY et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Illegitimacy-Custody and Support-Filiation Proceedings-
.. Support and .Attorney's Fees Pending .Action.-Under ·Civ. 
Code, § 196a, as amended in 1939, which provides that a civil 
suit . may be maintained in behalf of a minor illegitimate 
child to enforce the obligation of a parent for support and 
that in such an action the court shall have the power to 
order and enforce performance thereof the same as under 
§§ 137 .and .. 137.5, the court in its discretion may order the' 
payment of money necessary for the support of the illegiti-
mate child and for the prosecution of the action pending its 
determination. 
[21 Id. - Custody and Support-Statutory Provision-Presump-
tions-Intent to Change Law.-Since Civ. Code, § 196a, as 
amended in. 1939, which provides that in an action by an 
illegitimate/child to enforce a parental obligation for sup-
port the: court has power to order and enforce performance 
thereof the sa!p.e as under §§ 137, 137.5, is explicit in its 
. t,e~, .a~d .. ,:i.ts purpose, to provide for an award pendente lite 
'is . ~pp~rentfrom' the previous interpretation of the statute 
". ";:Which .d~D.ied " the right to counsel fees, costs and support 
;pending 'the' 'final determination of an action, it is presumed 
that the legislature in adopting the amendment had the prior 
decisions in' mind and intended to change the law. 
<irS] Id.~Custody: arid Support-Statutory Provision-Incorpora-
'tion of· Other Statutes by Reference.-By the reference in 
Civ. Code, § 196a, as amended in 1939, to § 137 all appro-
McK. Dig. References: 1, 4. illegitimacy, § 20; 2, 3. Illegiti-
rmacy, § 19. 
~ 
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priate provisions of that section are made applicable to an 
action brought under § 196a. And in an action brought in 
behalf of an illegitimate child to enforce a parental obliga-
tion for support, the court is authorized to order the defend-
ant to pay money necessary for support and prosecution of 
the action pending its determination. 
[4] Id. - Custody and Support-Filiation Proceedings-Support 
of Child Pending Action-Nature and Effect of Proceeding-
Appeal.-Upon the hearing of an order to show cause why 
the alleged father of a minor illegitimate child should not 
pay support, court costs, and attorney's fees pending deter-
mination of the action, the plaintiff must prove by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that the defendant is her father 
before he can be ordered to pay, and defendant must be 
given an opportunity to be heal"d and to present his evidence. 
And then,' even though the court issues the order, its implied 
finding of paternity is not'l'es judicata nor determinative 
of the issue of parentage at the trial. The resulting judg-
ment is appealable independent of the final judgment in the 
case. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior 
Court of Napa County, and Percy S. King, Judge thereof, to 
grant a hearing on an order to show cause why defendant 
should not pay support, court costs, and attorney's fees 
pending termination of action. Writ granted. 
Allen Spivock for Petitioner. 
Rutherford, Rutherford & Rutherford for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR,J.-Plaintiff, an illegitimate child, brought an 
action through her mother, her guardian ad litem, against the 
defendant for support and a judidal declaration of paternity . 
The trial court issued an order directing defendant to show 
cause why he should not pay support, court costs, and attor-
ney's fees pending determination of the action. Upon de-
fendant's objection that the court had no jurisdiction to 
order him to make such payments until he was adjudged the 
father of the child, the court refused to proceed with the 
hearing or to take any evidence. Plaintiff thereupon peti-
tioned this court for a writ of mandate to compel the respond-
4. See 13 Cal. Jur. 937; 6 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 399; 7 
Am. Jur. 695. 
18 O. (2d)-25 
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ent . court to grant a hearing on the order to show cause, 
~ontending'that the 1939 amendment to section 196a of the 
Civil·· C09,e' :gives the· ,court power to order the payme~t of 
support, cosi~, and counsel fees pendente lite in an action 
brought und~r 'that section. 
[1] Section 196a provides: "The father as well as the 
mother, of an illegitimate child must give him support and 
education suitable to his circumstances. A civil suit to en-
force such obligations may be maintained in behalf of a minor 
illegitimate child, by his mother or guardian, or by a guard-
ian ad Utem . . . and in such action the court shall have 
power to order and enforce performance thereof, the same as 
under sections 137, 137.5, 138, 139 and 140 of the Civil Code, 
in a suit for divorce by a wife." The references to sections 
137 and 137.5 in the last clause of the section were added in 
1939. 
Section 137 provides in part as follows: "When an action 
for divorce is pending, the court may, in its discretion, re-
quire the husband or wife, as the case may be, to pay as 
alimony any money necessary to enable the wife, or husband, 
to support herself and her children, or to support himself 
and his children, as the case may be, or to prosecute or de-
fe~d the. action. " 
Under the plain language of section 196a as ~mended the 
court in an action to enforce the obligation of a father to 
support an illegitimate child has the same power to order the 
performance of that obligation as it has to order the per-
formance of. a husband·'s obligation under section 137 in a 
suit for divorce by a wife. Under section 137 the court, 
when: an action for divorce is pending, may in its discretion 
order the husband to pay as alimony any money necessary 
to enable· the wife to support herself and her children or to 
prosecute the action. Therefore it may likewise in its dis-
cretion order the payment of money necessary for the sup-
port of the illegitimate child and the prosecution of the 
action pending its determination. (See 28 Cal. L. Rev. 442, 
446.) 
[2] . Not only is the amendment clear and explicit in its 
terms, but its purpose to provide for an award pendente lite 
. is apparent from the previous interpretation of section 196a. 
Although it was held that the final judgment might include 
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(2d) 122, [100 Pac. (2d) 806] ; Arias v. /(alensnikoff, 10 Cal .. 
(2d) 428 [74 Pac. (2d) 1043, 115 A. L. R. 163]) and sup-
port of the illegitimate child from the date of filing the 
complaint (I(yne v. I(yne, supra; Mathews v. Hornbeck, 80 
CaL App. 704 [252 Pac. 667]), the right to counsel fees, 
costs, and SUpport pending the final determination of the 
action was denied. (Schallman v. Haas, 33 Cal. App. 28 
164 Pac. 336].) The legislature in adopting the amendment 
presumably had these decisions in mind and intended to 
change the law. (Whitley v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. (2d) 
75 [113 Pac. (2d) 449]; Hoffman v. McNamara, 102 Cal. 
App. 280 [282 Pac. 990] ; People v. Weitzel, 201 Cal. 116 [255 
Pac. 792, 52 A. L. R. 811] ; Pierce v. Riley, 21 Cal. App. (Zd) 
513~ 520 [70 Pac. (2d) 206]. See Thomas v. Driscoll, 42 Cal. 
App. (2·d) 23 [108 Pac. (2d) 43].) 
[3] The contention that the reference to section 137 in-
corporates only the latter part of that section is untenable. 
That part provides for enforcement of a final judgment in a 
separate maintenance action by such orders as the court may 
from time to time deem necessary. Not only did the court 
have this power with respect to enforcement of the obliga-
tion to support the illegitimate child before the amendment to 
section 19'6a. (see Civ. Code, sec. 138 and Sweet v. Ham'/,1-
othoris, 84 Cal. App. 775, 782 [258 Pac. 652J), but the ref-
erence to section 137 makes all the appropriate provisions of 
that section applicable to an action brought under section 196a. 
Respondent contends that the defendant cannot be ordered 
to support the plainti.ff until he is proved to be her father. 
Th~ situation, however, is basically the same as in a divorce 
action when the fact of marriage is denied. Proof of par-
entage is a jurisdictional ,prerequisite for an order to sup-
port an illegitimate child (Kyne v. Kyne, supra) jUst as the 
existence ,of the marriage is a jurisdictional prerequisite for 
the right of the court to order support, costs, and counsel 
fees pendente lite in an action for divorce. (Hite v. Hite, 
124 Cal. 389 [57 Pac. 227, 71 Am. St. Rep. 82, 45 L. R. A. 
793]; In re Cook, 42 Cal. App. (2'd) 1 [108 Pac. (2d) 46] . 
See Lorraine v. Lorraine, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 687, 697 [48 Pac. 
. (2d) 48] .)Even though the defendant in an action for eli-
>I: 
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vorce denies the existence of the marriage, the court may 
nevertheless make the order if defendant is given an oppor-
tunity to be heard and the marriage is proved by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. (See Hite v. Hite, supra; Bancroft 
V. Bancroft, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 464 [50 Pac. (2d) 465].) The 
application is determined upon a record of its own and re-
sults in an appealable judgment independent of the final 
judgment in the action. (Robbins v. Mulcrevy, 101 CaL App. 
3'00 [281 Pac. 668].) Although such an order implies a find-
ing of the existence of the relationship, the proceeding need 
not. be so complete nor the evidence so extensive as upon the 
trial of the issues of the case and the order therefore does not 
determine those issues, nor affect the final judgment. (Sharon 
~~ Sha:ron, 75 Cal. 1 [16 Pac. 345] ; Hite v. Hite, supra.), 
[4] Since the decisions interpreting section 137 are di-
rectly applica1>le to actions under 196a, the plaintiff, upon the 
hearing of· the 'order to show cause, must prove by a pre-
ponderance .. q£ the, evidence that the defendant is her father 
before he can be ordered to pay her support, costs of suit, 
or counsel fee~ pending the trial of the issues of the case~ 
The. defendant must, be given an opportunity to be heard and 
Ito pI-,esent his evidence, Then, even though the court upon 
:a preponderarice of the evidence presented at the hearing 
issues the. order, its implied finding of paternity is not res 
judicata nor determinative of the issue of parentage at the 
trial. . The proceeding is merely a hearing upon an order to 
show cause for the purpose of determining plaintiff's right to 
an award pendente lite, and while defendant may put the 
'jurisdictional/prerequisite of parentage in issue, the evidence 
produced"by the parties need not be so extensive as at the 
trial 'of the action. The resulting judgment is temporary in 
effect; except as to payments already accrued thereunder,' its 
operation terminates upon the final determination of the 
action or' upon order of the court. It is appealable inde-
,pendently of the final judgment in the case. The rights of 
an alleged father in an action under section 196a thus receive 
'the same protection as those of an alleged husband under 
'section 137. 
In the instant case the trial court erroneously refused to 
permit plaintiff to introduce any evidence of paternity. Both 
plaintiff and defendant should have been heard on the order to 
~ 
- .... --"'~ .1 
Oct. 194I.J HICKS 11. OCEAN SHORE RAruwAD, INC. 773 
show cause and a decision made a. to the allowance of SUpport, 
attorney's fees, and costs pending the trial of the action. 
Let the writ of mandate issue as prayed. 
Gibson, O. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., and 
Carterl J., concurred. 
[So F. No. 16590. In Bank.-Oct. 17, 1941.J 
JAMES P. HICKS, Respondent, v. OOEAN SHORE RAIL. 
ROAD, INC. (a Corporation), et aI., Appellants. 
[1] Appeal-B.eview-1nsuJlic;ency of Evidence-consideration of 
Evidence._It is not the duty of an appellate court to evalu-
ate the evidence for the purpose of mak,ing new findings 
but merely to ascertain Whether there is substantial evidence 
in SUpport of the judgment. 
(2] Id.-Review-InsuJliciency of Evidenc&--'1'o Support Verdict 
-Verdict on Evidence Inherently Improbable-Asserted Per-
jurY.-The reversal of a judgment upon the ground of as-
serted perjury cannot be ordered except Where the testimony 
is such as to shock the moral sense of the Court. The testi-
mony must be incredible. Where such testimony is not in-
herently improbable it is the exclusive province of the jury 
to determine the truth of the matter in issue. 
(3] Id.-InsuJliciency of Evidence-'1'o Support Verdict--Verdjct 
on Evidence Inherently Improbable-Asserted PerjurY-Ques_ 
tion for JurY.-The confiicting statements of a plaintiff made 
to a witness about one hour after an accident that h~s injury 
was sustained While he was endeavoring to adjust the car-
buretor of the power shovel's motor did not support a claim 
of perjury in his testimony that the accident was caused by 
the employer's negligence in failing to furnish adequate 
protection to workmen engaged in removing rock and earth 
at a place where slides Were imminent and that the accident 
MCK. Dig. References: 1. Appeal and Error, § 1242; 2-4. Ap-
peal and Error, § 1267; 5. Evidence, § 156 (7); 6. Workmen's 
Compensation, § 18; 7. Trial, § 139 (3); 8. Damages, § 101; 9. 
Damages, § 89; 10. Damages, § 197; n, 14. Workmen'. Compen. 
sation, § 16; 12. Evidence, § 461; 13. Evidence, § 307; 15. Ap-
peal and Error, § 195; 16. Workmen's Compensation, § 14; 17. 
New Trial, § 82; 18. New Trial, § 12; 19. New Trial, § 163. 
